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We propose a new classical bit commitment protocol using the relativistic constraint that signals
cannot travel faster than the speed of light c. This protocol is unconditionally secure against both
classical or quantum attacks. The sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) each controls two secure
stations separated by a large distance d, and they communicate by exchanging classical information
only. Alice commits by sending from her stations two causally independent encrypted messages
to the neighboring Bob’s stations, after that the protocol is out of her control and she plays no
role in the unveiling phase. The commitment remains concealed for a period of ∆t = d/2c. This
protocol requires only limited communication resources and is readily implementable with current
technologies.
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Cryptography is a science with important prac-
tical applications. The most well known task in
cryptography is key distribution whose security can
be guaranteed by quantum mechanical means [1, 2].
Bit commitment is another basic cryptographic task
that has attracted much interest. The security of
bit commitment is an important issue because, apart
from being useful in its own right, it can be used as
a building block for other more complicated cryp-
tographic tasks such as coin tossing [3], oblivious
transfer [4–7], zero-knowledge proofs [8], and secure
two-party computation [9, 10], etc.
A bit commitment protocol involves two distrust-
ing parties (Alice and Bob), and it consists of two
separate procedures, Commit and Unveil. In Com-
mit, Alice commits to Bob a secret bit b ∈ {0, 1}
and provides him with a piece of evidence to bind
her commitment. In Unveil, Alice reveals the value
of b and normally needs to provide additional infor-
mation to Bob so that he can use the evidence to
check if the unveiled bit value is indeed the same as
what she had committed before. A bit commitment
protocol is secure if it is both concealing and bind-
ing. Concealing means Bob does not know the value
of b before Alice reveals it, and binding means Alice
cannot change the committed value of b without the
risk of being discovered by Bob. Furthermore if the
protocol remains secure even if Alice and Bob had
capabilities limited only by the laws of nature (this
is sometimes referred to as having unlimited compu-
tational power), then it is said to be unconditionally
secure.
A typical example of classical commitment is for
Alice to write the committed bit on a piece of pa-
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per and lock it in a safe. Alice gives the locked safe
to Bob as the evidence but keeps the key. Later
Alice unveils the bit and provides the key with
which Bob can check if Alice is honest. However,
like classical cryptography, bit commitment based
on the exchange of classical information alone can-
not be unconditionally secure. The securities of all
such protocols are vulnerable to advances in tech-
nologies and/or breakthroughs in solving computa-
tionally hard tasks. With the success of quantum
key distribution in cryptography [1], there was ini-
tially high hope that one could also use the laws
of quantum physics in bit commitment to guaran-
tee its security [11, 12]. Unfortunately this expec-
tation turned out to be unfounded. In 1997, May-
ers [13] and Lo and Chau [14] put forth a “no-go
theorem” showing that all concealing quantum bit
commitment protocols are not binding. The proof
is based on the observation that, using quantum en-
tanglement, the sender Alice can keep all undisclosed
classical information undetermined and stored at the
quantum level. In particular, she can choose to delay
all prescribed measurements without consequences
until it is required to disclose the outcomes. Then
it can be shown mathematically that Alice can un-
veil b = 0 or b = 1 as she wishes. Despite the no-
go theorem, the subject of unconditionally secure
quantum bit commitment has continued to attract
considerable interests. Some reinforced the impossi-
bility arguments [15–20], while others tried to show
the converse [21–24]. However, without introducing
new ingredients into the problem, so far no one has
been able to construct a quantum bit commitment
protocol which can be convincingly shown to be un-
conditionally secure.
The no-go theorem of Mayers-Lo-Chau is based
implicitly on non-relativistic physics which is only
an approximation in a world where the speed of light
2can be taken to be infinity. The principle of relativ-
ity however dictates that nothing can travel faster
than the speed of light. Using this constraint, Kent
has successfully constructed a classical bit commit-
ment scheme which can be shown to be uncondi-
tionally secure [25]. Apart from using relativistic
physics, this protocol departs from the standard bit
commitment scenario in that Alice (A) and Bob (B)
are allowed to set up trusted stations located far
away from themselves. This additional feature is
also present in all other versions of relativistic bit
commitment protocols proposed in recent years [26–
28].
In the latest 2012 proposal [27], Alice and Bob
each control three secure stations, (A1,A2,A3) and
(B1,B2,B3), respectively. The sender stations A2
and A3 are located far away on opposite sides of
A1, and each Ai has a receiver station Bi located
adjacent to it. B1 sends A1 a number of randomly
chosen BB84 qubits [1], depending on the value of
b she wants to commit, A1 measures the qubits in
one of the two BB84 bases and sends the measure-
ment outcomes securely to A2 and A3, who then
unveil by revealing the outcomes to B2 and B3 re-
spectively. This protocol is experimentally feasi-
ble and has been successfully implemented recently
[29, 30] with a commitment time of 15ms. Note that
this protocol involves quantum communications and
measurements which greatly increase the complex-
ity of security analysis theoretically [28]. Moreover,
when implemented in the real world, one also need to
consider the systematic errors in the preparation and
transmission of the quantum particles by Bob, and
also in the measurements executed by Alice. The
purpose of this paper is to present a new relativis-
tic bit commitment protocol which requires the ex-
change of classical information only. Due to the ab-
sence of quantum transmissions and measurements,
this protocol can be shown to be unconditionally se-
cure in a relatively transparent manner. Moreover
it can also be readily implemented in realistic situa-
tions.
Let Alice controls two secure stations (A1, A2),
and Bob controls another two (B1, B2). B1 and B2
are separated by a large distance d, but the distance
between B1 and A1 is negligible compared with d, so
is that between B2 and A2. We assume that there
are only classical communication channels between
Alice and Bob, but the same cannot be guaranteed
for internal communications between A1 and A2, or
B1 and B2. We shall make the idealization that
information transmits along all channels at the speed
of light c. Since Ai is adjacent to Bi (i = 1, 2), for
simplicity we shall take the time required to transmit
information between them to be negligible, so is the
time required to process information at each station.
Let (n0, n1,m0,m1, η) be random but distinct bit-
chains of length l (i.e., they are numbers between
0 and 2l − 1 in the binary form). It is understood
that (n0, n1) are generated on demand by B1, and
(m0,m1) by B2 independently. η is a secret key
shared by A1 and A2, it can be pre-established by
any secure quantum key distribution protocol, such
as BB84 [1]. The new protocol can be specified as
follows.
Commit:
1. Alice (A1, A2) decides the value of b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. At time t = 0, B1 sends to A1 two distinct
random bit-chains (n0, n1), and A1 commits
by returning the number Nb = (η xor nb) to
B1. Independently also at t = 0, B2 sends A2
two distinct random bit-chains (m0,m1), and
A2 commits by returning Mb = (η xor mb) to
B2.
3. B1 sends (λ0, λ1) to B2, where λi =
(Nb xor ni). Similarly, B2 sends (ζ0, ζ1) to
B1, where ζi = (Mb xor mi).
Unveil:
1. The protocol unveils when B1 receives (λ0, λ1)
and B2 receives (ζ0, ζ1) at t = d/c [31].
2. The committed value of b is obtained from the
conditions λb = ζb and λ1−b 6= ζ1−b. If neither
b = 0 nor b = 1 satisfies these conditions, then
Alice is cheating.
The unveiling mechanism can be understood as
follows. Without loss of generality, suppose A1 and
A2 commit to b = 0, then N0 = η xor n0 and
M0 = η xor m0. It follows that
λ0 = (η xor n0) xor n0 = η, (1)
ζ0 = (η xor m0) xor m0 = η, (2)
so that λ0 = ζ0. However
λ1 = (η xor n0) xor n1, (3)
ζ1 = (η xor m0) xor m1, (4)
are uncorrelated random numbers, so that λ1 6= ζ1.
Nevertheless in principle one cannot strictly rule out
the possibility that λ1 = ζ1 by chance, in which
case the unveiled result is ambiguous. However the
probability for this to happen is 1/2l, which can be
made as small as desired by adopting a large l.
Next we show that this protocol is uncondition-
ally secure. Clearly, Nb and Mb are respectively en-
cryptions of nb and mb, with η being the common
encryption key or one-time pad. It is well known in
cryptography that, without the knowledge of η and
before B1 and B2 have time to exchange informa-
tion, Nb and Mb are nothing but random numbers
from which no information of b can be extracted.
Hence the commitment is concealed for 0 ≤ t < d/c.
Here we have implicitly assume that Bob sets up
3only two stations (B1 and B2) as stipulated by the
protocol. However in principle nothing can prevent
him from setting up a secret station B3 somewhere
else. The optimal location for B3 is half way be-
tween B1 and B2. Then the information sent by B1
and B2 at t = 0 (step 3 of Commit) will both arrive
B3 at t = d/2c, and the commitment is unveiled.
Therefore, for unconditional security, the length of
the commitment period (∆t) should be taken to be
d/2c instead of d/c.
Next we consider the issue of binding. As we saw,
A1’s commitment is separated from A2’s by a space-
like interval, the principle of relativity dictates that
these two events are causally independent. Hence a
dishonest Alice has only two choices before making
the commitment: (1) Do A1 and A2 commit to the
same b? and (2) Do they use the same η? Now since
A1 and A2 must commit at the same moment t = 0,
it does not make sense logically for them to com-
mit to different values of b. It is easy to show that,
if A1 and A2 commit to different values of b, then
the conditions λb = ζb and λ1−b 6= ζ1−b will not be
satisfied by neither b = 0 nor b = 1, independent
of whether they use the same η or not. Given that
A1 and A2 commit to the same b, they must use the
same η, otherwise the unveiling process will again
be unsuccessful, even if they choose to be honest.
The argument is more transparent and straightfor-
ward from the following point of view. Notice that
the protocol is completely out of Alice’s control af-
ter she commits and she does not play any role in
the unveiling phase. This fact already implies that
Alice cannot cheat. The reason is that, no matter
which value of b is revealed in the unveiling phase,
it is a direct consequence of what Alice did when
she committed, not what she might have done after-
ward. We conclude that the protocol is safe against
classical attacks.
We now consider quantum attacks. As mentioned
before, all the information exchanged between Al-
ice and Bob in the commitment phase are restricted
to be classical in nature. That is, the numbers
n0, n1,m0,m1, Nb, and Mb are all concrete clas-
sical numbers without any ambiguities to the re-
spective receivers. Bob has no quantum cheating
strategy because he must send classical numbers
(n0, n1,m0,m1) to Alice, and also receives classical
numbers (Nb,Mb) in return. Alice does not have
much freedom either because the numbers Nb and
Mb she sends to Bob in the commitment phase are
restricted to be classical. It is well known that quan-
tum attacks depend on the fact that the dishonest
party can leave all undisclosed parameters undeter-
mined at the quantum level [13, 14]. Now the only
parameter that Alice keeps secret is η. Although η
is not known to Bob before unveiling, it is clear that
Alice cannot leave it undetermined at the quantum
level when she commits, otherwise she won’t be able
to produce the two classical numbers Nb and Mb to
be sent to Bob. This point is also obvious from the
fact that Alice does not play any role in the unveil-
ing phase of protocol, that is, she is not required to
specify the unknown parameter η when the proto-
col unveils. This fact clearly implies that she has no
freedom to leave it undetermined when she commits.
We conclude that neither Alice nor Bob has a viable
quantum cheating strategy.
Furthermore since Bob sends to Alice classical de-
scriptions of (n0, n1) and (m0,m1), and she must
send back classical numbers (Nb,Mb) in return, Al-
ice can only make classical commitments. That is,
she has no freedom to commit to a superposition of
b = 0 and b = 1. That means when our protocol is
used as a subprotocol in a more complicated task,
one can be sure that b has a definite classical value
before the protocol is opened [27].
For simplicity, we have made the idealization that
information are transmitted at light speed c, and
that the distance between Ai and Bi is negligible, so
is the time required for the agents to process infor-
mation. There is no difficulties to take into account
the actual limitations when implemented in the real
world. Realistically we can specify that Alice’s com-
mitments must be completed at t = δ << d/c. The
length of the commitment time remains ∆t = d/2c,
starting from t = δ until t = δ + d/2c. The actual
speed of information transmission between B1 and
B2 may be less than the speed of light, but Alice can-
not be sure of that, so ∆t = d/2c can be regarded
as an unconditionally safe lower bound.
Notice that in the protocol proposed above, A1
and A2 play symmetric roles, so do B1 and B2. How-
ever in some applications it may be more convenient
or advantageous to have one of Alice’s and Bob’s sta-
tions (say A2 and B2) play subordinate roles only.
Such a protocol is also possible and can be specified
as follows.
Commit: (1)A1 decides the value of b ∈ {0, 1}.
(2)At time t = 0, B1 sends to A1 two distinct ran-
dom bit-chains (n0, n1), and A1 commits by return-
ing the number Nb = (η xor nb) to B1. At the same
time (t = 0), A2 sends η to B2, and B2 sends η to
B1.
Unveil: (1)The protocol unveils when B1 receives η
at t = d/c from B2 [31]. (2)The committed value of
b is obtained from the condition nb = η xor Nb.
In this protocol, A2 does not need to know the
value of b to be committed, her only role is to deliver
the encryption key η to B2. From the discussions
we have gone through earlier, the security of this
alternative protocol is quite obvious: (1) B1 cannot
extract any information from Nb until he receives
the key η from B2. (2) Alice cannot cheat because
the protocol is out of her control after she commits.
(3) The unconditionally secure commitment time is
again ∆ = d/2c as before.
To summarize, we have proposed a new uncon-
ditionally secure bit commitment protocol base on
4the relativistic restriction that signals cannot travel
faster than the speed of light. This protocol does not
involve any quantum particles so that the theoretical
security analysis is relatively simple and transparent,
moreover it can be readily implemented experimen-
tally. Alice commits by making two encryptions sep-
arated by a space-like interval. Security against Bob
is guaranteed by the fact that an encrypted message
contains no extractable information without the key.
One special feature of the protocol is that Alice does
not play a role in the unveiling phase, in fact she
has no control over the protocol after she commits;
this feature clearly implies that Alice cannot cheat
by classical or quantum means. In addition to the
original one, we have also proposed an alternative
protocol where one of Alice’s stations plays only a
subordinate role. This protocol is also uncondition-
ally secure, and it may be more convenient or ad-
vantageous in certain cryptographic applications.
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